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Abstract 
In competitive authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions and periodic elections are 
sponsored by the authoritarian ruler, but voting outcomes are sometimes manipulated to prevent 
government turnover. In this paper, I investigate the conditions under which a unified opposition 
might decide to challenge the official election outcome, the conditions under which the authoritarian 
incumbent might find it profitable to manipulate the election outcome, as well as the conditions under 
which voters might decide to vote strategically for their least-preferred alternative in order to help 
avoid a costly post-electoral conflict. I find that the incumbent's decision about whether to commit 
fraud or acknowledge the true election outcome, as well as the opposition's decision about whether to 
contest or accept official election results, depends on the opposition's knowledge about the occurrence 
of fraud, as well as on the likelihood of successful collective action against the regime. Fears of post 
electoral violence may lead incumbent or opposition supporters to vote strategically for their least 
preferred alternative, and the probability that they do so depends on their expectations about the 
opposition's reaction to official election results. 
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1 Introduction
In the culmination of the third-wave of democratization that started in the mid seventies,
most regimes did not democratize fully, but turned into what scholars have come to call
electoral authoritarian regimes (Huntington, 1991; Diamond, 2002; Howard and Roessler,
2002; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002).1 In this paper, I focus on the nature of
voter behavior, and incentives for electoral malfeasance and the challenge of election results
in elections held under autocratic competition. In contrast to elections taking place under
hegemonic competition, these elections are contested by one or more opposition candidates
(Diamond, 2002; Howard and Roessler, 2002). However, as pointed out by Levitsky and
Way (2002, p. 53), “incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition ade-
quate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases
manipulate electoral results.” I find that the incumbent’s decision about whether to commit
fraud or acknowledge the true election outcome, as well as the opposition’s decision about
whether to contest or accept official election results, depends on the opposition’s knowledge
about the occurrence of fraud, as well as on the likelihood of successful collective action
against the regime. Also, fears of post electoral violence may lead incumbent or opposition
supporters to vote strategically for their least preferred alternative, and the probability that
they do so depends on their expectations about the opposition reaction to official election
results.
The 2009 Zimbabwe presidential election serves as an example of how government manip-
ulation can drive the electoral process far from the democratic ideal of “fair, honest and free
elections” (Diamond, 2002). In this election, the candidate from the Movement for Demo-
1According to Diamond (2002, p. 26), out of 167 regimes classified as formal democracies
in 2001, 21 fell into the competitive authoritarian category, with the remaining regimes
consisting of 73 liberal democracies, 31 electoral democracies, 17 ambiguous regimes, and
25 hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes. Also, Diamond identifies 25 politically closed
authoritarian regimes, that do not make use of democratic forms such as elections, and thus
do not fall into the electoral authoritarian category.
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cratic Change (MDC), Morgan Tsvangirai, was the main contender against the incumbent
candidate of the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Robert
Mugabe, who had ruled the country since its independence in 1980. Ahead of the election,
the opposition complained about manipulation of voter rolls and the reduced number of
polling places in urban areas, where the MDC was stronger.2 Official results were posted
more than a month after the election, with Tsvangirai and Mugabe obtaining 47.9 and 43.2
percent of the vote, respectively, implying a runoff election was necessary.3 In the meantime,
the government raided opposition headquarters and a suspicious recount took place in some
constituencies.4 Later in May, the runoff was officially set for three months after the first
round. The opposition alleged the late date was illegal and that the government would use
the intervening time to continue terrorizing MDC supporters with violence and threats. In-
deed, the level of aggression escalated and on the last Sunday before the election, Tsvangirai
withdrew on the grounds of violence against his supporters.5 Still, Mugabe ran unchallenged
in the second round. According to the press, voters were rounded up to the polls, and the
outcome was a 85.5 percent victory in favor of Mugabe, with turnout figures standing above
those observed in the first round. In a July editorial, the New York Times reported that
“the brutality with which Robert Mugabe stole Zimbabwe’s election last month embarrassed
even his usual friends, allies and enablers.”6
2Sapa-AP, March 18, 2008, “Opposition demand electronic voters’ roll.”
3The New York Times, May 3, 2008, “Zimbabwe Calls for Runoff, but Opposition Chal-
lenges Vote Count.”
4The New York Times, April 26, 2008, “Zimbabwe Rounds Up Opposition Members and
Election Monitors.” According to AFP (April 22, 2008), a member of the Southern African
Development Community who observed the recount stated that “of particular concern was
the evidence of ballot-box tampering that I witnessed personally, which points to a con-
certed effort to rig the election results in order to bring about a [President Robert] Mugabe
‘victory’.”
5The New York Times, June 23, 2008, “Mugabe Rival Quits Zimbabwe Runoff, Citing
Attacks.”
6The New York Times, June 27, 2008, “A Grim Image of Politics in Zimbabwe Emerges.”
Previous academic studies (Kriger, 2005; Laakso, 2002; Makumbe, 2002; Sachikonye, 2002)
described similar incidents in previous elections in Zimbabwe , including: manipulation of
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The 2009 presidential election in Zimbabwe serves as an example of how elections take
place under competitive authoritarian regimes. In such systems, opposition parties some-
times challenge unfavorable election results, and organize demonstrations against the out-
come, demanding further democratic liberalization (Beaulieu, 2008). Even though opposition
parties are generally portrayed as benign actors who challenge official results based on legit-
imate claims (as in the Zimbabwe example), it is important to consider alternative scenarios
where neither the incumbent nor the opposition exhibit positive orientations toward the
democratic principles, and where as a result “protest can also come from opposition polit-
ical parties, who need not be true democrats” (Beaulieu, 2008). In this paper I determine
the optimal strategies of the different players considering alternative scenarios—in particu-
lar, scenarios where the incumbent faces a democratic opposition, and scenarios where the
incumbent faces an authoritarian opposition. Moreover, I consider a scenario that can ac-
commodate a situation where even though the opposition is firmly attached to democratic
principles, uncertainty about the true electoral outcome and the extent of fraud may lead
the opposition to challenge fair official results.
In this context, when should we expect the opposition to mount a serious challenge against
the regime? Perceptions of electoral fraud can help overcome the collective action problem
usually associated with participation in social movements. According to Tarrow (1994, p.
18) collective action is facilitated when the opening of political opportunities “lower[s] the
election law and timing; use of violence, torture, imprisonment and intimidation against
opposition supporters; impunity for those perpetrating the attacks; vote buying with cash
or promises of land; approval of legislation to repress the opposition by proscribing the
organization of rallies; monopoly of the electronic media and use of public resources during
the campaign; purposefully damaging the reputation of the judiciary and forced retirement
of judges; and damage and occupation of the properties of opposition supporters in rural
areas—perpetrated by army-sponsored war veterans and even the police. Laakso (2002)
writes that during occupations, “invaders terrorized, beat, raped, intimidated and killed
alleged supporters of the MDC.” Also, during the voting period Makumbe (2002) mentions
the use of ballot box stuffing and police force to drive away citizens waiting in line to cast
their ballots in some urban constituencies; and that the government urged poll workers to
process votes slowly, leading to 11-12 hour waits in some urban polling places.
4
costs of collective action, reveal[s] potential allies and show[s] where elites and authorities are
vulnerable”. When voters share their perceptions of electoral fraud, allegations of electoral
malfeasance represent a political opportunity that can be used by the opposition to mobilize
voters against the regime. Javeline (2003, p. 109) argues that “specific attributions of blame
lower organization and opportunity costs [by allowing] individuals to focus and therefore
limit the scope of their proposed collective action.” If individuals agree on who to blame for
the manipulation of the election outcome, then this may work as a trigger for protests against
the regime. Similarly, Tucker (2007, p. 541) claims that the occurrence of major electoral
fraud “provides an obvious focal point for action.” The more people participate in protests,
the smaller the probability an individual is personally attacked, so the costs associated with
participation decrease. Further, the greater the likelihood of a successful protest, the larger
the benefits associated with the challenge, because a victory entails overturning the election
outcome. Therefore, the likelihood of a successful protest against the results is likely to be
larger after the occurrence of blatant electoral fraud.7
Fear plays a key role in these elections. When the potential cost of post electoral violence
is as large as in the Zimbabwe case, where opposition supporters risk losing their property
or lives, then a voter’s primary objective can shift from affecting the election outcome and
expressing support for her favorite candidate, to preventing post-electoral violence. Further,
while in normal conditions they would pay attention to the country’s most urgent issues,
7Tucker illustrates his argument using the Colored Revolutions in Serbia (Bulldozer Rev-
olution, 2000), Georgia (Rose Revolution, 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution, 2004) and
Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution, 2005) as examples. He argues that “all four colored revolu-
tions featured instances of (. . . ) major electoral fraud” (Tucker, 2007, p. 537), and in all
cases electoral fraud triggered mass protests which sooner or later ended up in the president’s
resignation, or the judiciary overturning the results. According to Lohmann (1994), when an
initial signal reveals some weakness of the regime, subsequent demonstrations can trigger an
information cascade where more information about the true nature of the regime is revealed.
Thus, even though electoral fraud by itself may not be enough to bring about a downfall of
the regime, demonstrations can be used to expose other government weaknesses. This may
lead to further changes in the political opportunity structure and an expansion of collective
action that may finally force the incumbent to recognize defeat.
5
fear of post electoral violence may lead voters to disregard issues and just focus on their
immediate safety. In this paper, I investigate the role played by fear of post-electoral vi-
olence on voter behavior, under different opposition types. In particular, I consider three
opposition types. First, one that is non-strategic, in the sense that it challenges unfavor-
able election results with some exogenous probability. Two special cases of the latter type
are an acquiescent opposition, which accepts any election outcome, and an opportunistic
opposition, which challenges any unfavorable election outcome. Second, I consider a strate-
gic and perfectly informed opposition that challenges unfavorable election results with some
non-zero probability. Two special cases of this type are a democratic opposition, which may
only win a contest of the result when the incumbent committed outcome-altering electoral
fraud, and an authoritarian opposition, which is as likely to mount a successful challenge of
the official election outcome when the incumbent won fairly, as when it won by committing
outcome-altering fraud. Lastly, I consider a strategic but imperfectly informed opposition
that is uncertain about the true election outcome, as well as about the occurrence of fraud.
Magaloni (2006, p. 77) argues that—in the context of a strategic situation similar to
the one analyzed in this paper—voters who sincerely prefer the opposition might vote for
the autocratic incumbent ‘strategically’, out of fear of post-electoral violence in the event
the opposition wins the election. I find that this reaction is reasonable within Magaloni’s
setting where post-electoral conflicts are the result of legitimate challenges by the opposition
of unfair election outcomes. In the model considered in this paper, however, either the
incumbent or the opposition might decide to act against democratic precepts; the former may
commit electoral fraud, and the later may decide to challenge even fair election outcomes,
respectively. In this context, strategic support for the incumbent directed at preventing
post-electoral violence is sometimes reasonable under a democratic opposition, but is not
always reasonable under an acquiescent or anti-system opposition. Further, even under a
democratic opposition, uncertainty about the occurrence of electoral fraud may result in a
challenge of fair outcomes, thus reducing voters’ expected utility associated with strategically
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voting for the incumbent in order to prevent a post-electoral conflict, since a fair victory by
the incumbent need not prevent an opposition challenge of the official election results, nor
the ensuing post-electoral violence.
The following are the main results of the paper: when the opposition is strategic, it
contests unfavorable official outcomes whenever the cost of the challenge is small relative
to the probability it wins the contest, adjusted for the gains from holding office. Addition-
ally, when it is strategic but uncertain about the true election outcome, it updates beliefs
based on the costs of post electoral violence and the costs of committing fraud, and acts
accordingly. Regarding the incumbent, the likelihood of fraud increases with the probabil-
ity of winning a challenge of the results, as well as in the spoils from holding office, but
decreases with the probability that the opposition contests the official election outcome.
Finally, regarding voter behavior, there are situations where opposition supporters might
prefer to vote strategically—to prevent post-electoral violence—and other situations where
incumbent supporters are the ones who might want to desert the preferred alternative.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next two sections, I study voter
choice between an autocratic incumbent and a unified opposition, the incumbent’s decision
regarding whether to commit electoral fraud or not, and the opposition’s decision regard-
ing whether to challenge the official election result or not, under different opposition types;
non-strategic, strategic and perfectly informed, and strategic but imperfectly informed. Sub-
sequently, I explain how changes in the structure of the game might lead to situations where
the incumbent faces incentives to commit fraud even after receiving a majority of the vote.
After that, I briefly describe three real world examples where observed outcomes are consis-
tent with some of the conclusions of game-theoretic analysis. I conclude by explaining how
the different sections of the paper fit together to provide a comprehensive and simple theory
of how voter behavior, electoral fraud, and post-electoral conflict take place under autocratic
competition.
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2 The Basic Model
The sequential structure of the game is similar to that discussed in Magaloni (2006, p.
77). First, voters decide whether to support the incumbent or vote for a unified opposition.
Then, after observing the true election outcome, the incumbent decides whether to commit
electoral fraud or report the true result. In those cases where a majority of voters supported
the opposition candidate, the incumbent may commit outcome-altering fraud ; and in those
cases where a majority of voters supported the incumbent, the incumbent may still commit
superfluous fraud in order to inflate its vote share. Lastly, after observing the official election
results, the opposition may accept or challenge the official election result. The extensive
form of the game is shown in Figure 1. In the analysis of the different cases, I modify the
representation to improve the exposition, but the sequence of decisions remains the same.
The game has eight possible outcomes, all depicted in Figure 1. When a majority of
voters support the incumbent and the latter commits superfluous fraud, the opposition can
either accept the tainted result (Outcome A: Superfluous Fraud, Unchallenged), or challenge
it (Outcome B: Superfluous Fraud, Challenged). Then, when a majority of voters support
the incumbent and there is no electoral fraud, the opposition can either accept the fair official
result (Outcome C: Fair Incumbent Victory, Unchallenged), or challenge it (Outcome D: Fair
Incumbent Victory, Challenged). When, instead, a majority of voters support the opposition
but the incumbent commits outcome-altering fraud, the opposition can again either accept
the fraudulent result (Outcome E: Outcome-Altering Fraud, Unchallenged), or challenge
it (Outcome F: Outcome-Altering Fraud, Challenged). Lastly, when a majority of voters
support the opposition and the incumbent does not commit electoral fraud, the opposition
always accepts the fair official result (Outcome G: Fair Opposition Victory, Unchallenged).
In those cases in which the opposition decides to challenge the election outcome, the
probability of an opposition victory (β) depends on the latter’s ability to overcome collective
action problems and successfully organize mass protests against the official result. Empirical
evidence suggests that successful collective action is more likely after the occurrence of
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blatant electoral fraud, since widespread fraud serves as a “focal point for action.” Thus, I
assume that the probability of an opposition victory when a majority of voters supported the
incumbent (denoted β), is not greater than the probability of an opposition victory when a
majority of voters supported the opposition and the incumbent committed outcome-altering
fraud (denoted β)—that is, it is assumed that β ≥ β.
2.1 Utilities
Voters’ policy benefits depend on which candidate wins the election. If the opposition does
not challenge the official election result and the incumbent remains in government, a typical
voter i obtains benefit uiI , which depends on the average issue distance between the voter
and the incumbent along the policy space. If instead the opposition is officially declared the
winner, and there is government turnover, a typical voter i obtains benefit uiO, which depends
on the average issue distance between the voter and the opposition along the policy space. So
far, I have described voter benefits associated with unchallenged election outcomes. In those
cases where the incumbent is officially declared the winner but the opposition challenges the
election outcome, the utility perceived by voters will additionally depend on the likelihood
the opposition wins the contest (β) and the cost to voters of the post-electoral conflict
(cvi). Specifically, if the opposition challenges the official election outcome, voters’ expected
utility equals: (1− β) · uiI + β · uiO − cvi. The term cvi includes the psychological and
economic costs of exposure to violence, a deteriorating economic environment, and increased
government encroachment on civil liberties and freedoms. I assume that cvi follows a uniform
distribution in the interval (0, cv) and search for cutoff strategies of the form: vote for
candidate j if cvi < K · ui, where K is a constant and ui is defined as the excess preference
for the incumbent—computed as ui = uiI − uiO. Thus, voter choice depends on the excess
preference for the incumbent, as well as on the degree of fear of post-electoral violence.
The payoff perceived by the incumbent, in turn, depends on whether it is able to remain
in government. If the incumbent wins the election without committing electoral fraud, and
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the opposition does not challenge the official result, then the incumbent perceives g—where
g represents the spoils from holding office. If the incumbent commits either superfluous or
outcome-altering electoral fraud, doing so costs him an amount cf that is subtracted from
the benefits from eventually holding office. Thus, if the incumbent commits fraud and the
opposition challenges the results, the incumbent only perceives g with probability (1 − β),
minus the cost of committing fraud (cf ), so its expected utility from holding office equals:
(1− β) · g− cf . Finally, if the opposition wins and the incumbent does not commit electoral
fraud, and there is no challenge of the results, then the incumbent obtains zero benefits. The
cost of committing fraud faced by the incumbent (cf ) is revealed just before the incumbent
makes the decision of whether to commit fraud or not, so it is not observed by voters on
the day of the election. However, it is assumed that voters share the belief that the cost of
committing fraud is uniformly distributed between zero and cf . In order to guarantee that
beliefs about the likelihood of fraud are well-defined, I assume that cf > g, meaning that the
maximum possible cost of manipulating the election results—say, if a civil war ensued—is
larger than the spoils from office.
Conversely, the payoff perceived by the opposition, depends on whether it is able to win
the election through regular electoral means or by challenging the official election result.
If the opposition wins the election without the need to challenge the results, it obtains a
payoff g corresponding to the spoils from holding office. In contrast, if the incumbent is
officially declared the winner and the opposition challenges the election result, it faces a cost
cp regardless of the outcome of the post-electoral contest. Thus, if the opposition challenges
the official election results, it only perceives g with probability β, minus the cost of the
challenge (cp), so its expected utility from holding office when challenging the results equals:
β · g − cp. Lastly, if the incumbent is officially declared the winner and the opposition does
not challenge the results, then the opposition obtains zero benefits. The cost of the post-
electoral conflict faced by the opposition (cp), is revealed just before the opposition makes the
decision of whether to challenge the official election result. Still, voters and the incumbent
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share the belief that cp is uniformly distributed between zero and cp. In order to guarantee
that beliefs about the likelihood of a post-electoral contest are well-defined, I assume that
cp > β · g, meaning that the maximum possible cost of successfully challenging the results is
larger than the expected benefit associated with challenging the official election results.
2.2 Opposition Types
I compute the equilibrium results for the following scenarios:
• Non-strategic opposition: One that challenges the results with some exogenous proba-
bility δ.
• Strategic and perfectly informed opposition: One that determines whether it is optimal
to challenge or accept the results, based on information which includes the true election
outcome and observations about whether the incumbent committed fraud or not.
• Strategic and imperfectly informed opposition: One that behaves strategically but does
not observe the true election outcome, or whether the incumbent committed fraud or
not.
3 Analysis
Under the first two opposition types (non-strategic, and strategic and perfectly informed),
the game is one of incomplete but perfect information; actors know the previous actions of
other players, but there is uncertainty about the final payoff. In these cases, I use backward
induction to find the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the different games. This solution
concept requires that actors best respond to other players’ actions within each subgame.
Under the third opposition type (strategic and imperfectly informed), the game has both
incomplete and imperfect information; some actors do not know the previous actions of other
players, and there is uncertainty about the final payoffs. In this case, I search for the perfect
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Bayesian equilibria of the game (PBE). Under a PBE actors have beliefs about the actions
of other players, and equilibrium behavior is be consistent with beliefs. Next, I do a verbal
discussion of the results of the game-theoretic analysis. For a detailed formal derivation of
the results, see the appendix.
3.1 Non-Strategic-Opposition
I first consider a scenario where the opposition does not behave strategically; that is, where
the opposition’s decision about whether to challenge the election outcome or not, does not
depend on whether the incumbent committed electoral fraud, but on an exogenous probabil-
ity δ. The parameter δ determines the opposition non-strategic sub-type, with the extreme
cases being:
• Acquiescent opposition (δ = 0): One that never challenges an incumbent victory; not
even following blatant outcome-altering fraud.
• Opportunistic opposition (δ = 1): One that always challenges an incumbent victory;
even following a clearly free and fair election.
In the generic case in which a non-strategic opposition challenges the election outcome
with some exogenous probability δ, I find the following:
First, since the incumbent only cares about winning a majority of the vote, it will never
commit superfluous fraud following a favorable election outcome, where by favorable I mean
that most voters supported the incumbent. However, in the case of an unfavorable outcome,
the incumbent will commit outcome-altering fraud whenever the cost of manipulating the
election result is lower than the expected benefit of winning the election. Holding the cost of
fraud constant, the likelihood this condition is satisfied increases with the spoils from office,
and decreases with the likelihood of a post-electoral contest of the official election result,
as well as with the likelihood of regime transition following a post-electoral contest. This
implies that, everything else constant, the likelihood of fraud is greater when the incumbent
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faces an acquiescent opposition (in which case there is zero chance of a post-electoral fraud
and regime transition following the occurrence of fraud) than when it faces an opportunistic
opposition (in which case the occurrence of outcome-altering fraud always leads to a post-
electoral conflict).
Even within this very simple framework, it is possible to begin to evaluate under which
conditions voters might have an incentive to vote strategically for the least-preferred candi-
date, instead of sincerely, in order to help prevent the occurrence of a costly post-electoral
conflict. As explained in the previous section, it is assumed that voters’ utilities are a func-
tion of expected policy benefits and the cost of a potential challenge to the election outcome.
Thus, in the context of a non-strategic opposition that challenges any incumbent victory
with a certain probability, voters face no incentive to vote strategically for the incumbent in
order to allow it to win legitimately and prevent a post-electoral of a fraudulent outcome,
the reason being that the opposition is as likely to challenge a fair incumbent victory as a
fraudulent one. Paradoxically, exactly the opposite might take place: if the cost to voters
of a post-electoral conflict is sufficiently high, voters who prefer the incumbent might face
incentives to vote strategically for the opposition in order to prevent the occurrence of a
post-electoral contest, specially so the smaller the likelihood the incumbent wins the con-
test. Voters who prefer the opposition, however, always behave sincerely; they have nothing
to gain by voting strategically for the incumbent.
3.2 Strategic Opposition (Perfectly Informed)
A strategic and perfectly informed opposition is one that first observes the true election
outcome, then observes whether the incumbent committed fraud or not, and lastly decides
whether to challenge the official election results or not, based on which action provides
the greatest expected utility. I find that the likelihood the opposition decides to challenge
the official election result decreases with the cost of a post-electoral conflict, and increases
with the spoils from office, as well as with the chance that it wins a post-electoral contest
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against the incumbent. Since the likelihood that the opposition wins a contest against the
incumbent is greater following the occurrence of outcome-altering fraud than when a majority
of voters actually supported the incumbent, post-electoral conflicts are more likely to take
place following the occurrence of outcome-altering fraud.
Within this modified framework, it is again possible to consider different opposition sub-
types. In particular, I consider different scenarios depending on the probability β that the
opposition mounts a successful challenge of a fair election outcome. Thus, the parameter β
determines the opposition strategic sub-type, with the extreme cases being:
• Democratic opposition (β = 0 and β > 0): One that is not able to successfully mo-
bilize supporters against the official election result, unless the incumbent committed
outcome-altering electoral fraud, in which case there is some non-zero probability that
the opposition wins the post-electoral conflict.
• Authoritarian opposition (β = β and β > 0): One that is as likely to successfully mobi-
lize supporters against the official election result following the occurrence of outcome-
altering fraud, as following a situation where most voters actually supported the in-
cumbent. That is, where the chance the opposition wins a post-electoral conflict is
independent of the fairness of the official result.
Note that an authoritarian opposition is not the same as an opportunistic opposition.
While opportunism is a characteristic of the leadership in charge of deciding whether or not to
challenge the election outcome, authoritarianism is a characteristic of the opposition’s base of
support within the electorate. While opportunism implies that leaders take advantage of any
opportunity that may allow them to take office (regardless of the probabilities of success),
authoritarianism implies that the collective efforts of opposition supporters following the
outburst of a post-electoral conflict are independent of the occurrence of outcome-altering
fraud, as authoritarian opposition supporters feel no attachment to democratic principles
(they might fail in their collective efforts, but not due to moral considerations). Still, it
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is clear that both opportunistic and authoritarian opposition sub-types are examples of
anti-regime oppositions, where at least some actors within the opposition (either leaders or
followers) hold no real concern for the integrity of the electoral process and only care about
seeing the incumbent removed from office. In those cases in which neither leaders nor follow-
ers feel any attachment to democratic principles, the opposition should be characterized as
both opportunistic and authoritarian; a non-strategic opposition sub-type, since its behavior
does not depend on either the incumbent’s or voters’ actions.
In the generic case of a strategic opposition, I again find that since the benefits from
holding office only depend on the identity of the winning candidate (not on the candidate’s
or party’s vote share), superfluous fraud is fruitless and strictly dominated when a majority of
voters voted for the incumbent. However, when a majority of voters vote for the opposition,
the incumbent again has incentives to commit outcome-altering electoral fraud. In the latter
case, the likelihood of fraud again increases with the spoils from office, and decreases with the
cost of fraud, as well as with the likelihood that the opposition wins a post-electoral contest.
The latter probability, β, affects the likelihood of fraud through two different channels: first,
because it helps determine the expected outcome of a potential post-electoral contest, and
second, because it affects the likelihood the opposition chooses to challenge an unfair election
outcome, the greater this probability, the greater the threat posed by a potential challenge
of the official election result by the opposition, and the lower the likelihood of fraud.
Specifically, given the distribution of the cost of committing fraud, while the probability
of outcome-altering fraud equals
α1 =
(
1− β · δ) · g
cf
under a non-strategic opposition with exogenous probability δ of challenging the official
election results; the probability of outcome-altering fraud equals
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α2 =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
under a generic strategic opposition. Thus, the likelihood the incumbent commits outcome-
altering fraud is smaller in the latter case whenever
δ < β · g
cp
For a given δ, this condition is more likely to be satisfied the larger β, the greater the spoils
from office g, and the smaller the maximum cost of the post-electoral conflict cp faced by the
opposition. In other words, the likelihood of fraud is smaller under a strategic opposition
when the latter has strong incentives (due to the high expected “profit”) to challenge a
fraudulent election outcome.
Voter behavior also differs depending on the opposition type (non-strategic or strategic)
and sub-type (democratic or authoritarian). While under a non-strategic opposition a voter
preferring the opposition always behaves sincerely, under a strategic opposition those who
prefer the opposition might have an incentive to vote strategically for the incumbent to
prevent a post-electoral conflict. This might happen when the cost of a post-electoral conflict
is high, and when the probability of a post-electoral conflict following a situation where most
voters voted for the opposition (increasing in the likelihood of outcome-altering fraud and
in likelihood that the opposition challenges a fraudulent incumbent victory) is larger than
the probability of a post-electoral conflict following an election where most voters voted for
the incumbent (increasing in the likelihood that the opposition challenges a fair incumbent
victory).
But not only those voters who prefer the opposition might sometimes face incentives to
vote strategically. When the cost of a post-electoral conflict is large and the probability of
a post-electoral conflict following an election where most voters voted for the incumbent is
larger than the probability of a post-electoral conflict following a situation where most voters
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voted for the opposition, then a voter preferring the incumbent might vote strategically for
the opposition in order to prevent the occurrence of a costly post-electoral conflict.
Note that while the first “strategic voting” condition (the one that predicts strategic
desertion by opposition supporters in favor of the incumbent) is more likely to be satisfied
under a democratic opposition than under an authoritarian opposition; the second strategic
voting condition (the one that predicts strategic desertion by incumbent supporters in favor
of the opposition) is more likely to be satisfied under an authoritarian opposition than under
a democratic opposition. Thus, manifest opposition willingness to challenge even fair out-
comes might contribute to deterring strategic electoral desertion by opposition supporters
(since under such circumstances, a “fair” incumbent victory would not prevent the occur-
rence of a costly post-electoral conflict), and to promoting strategic electoral desertion by
incumbent supporters. These results suggests that, under certain circumstances, a demo-
cratic opposition might face incentives to pose as an authoritarian opposition, since doing
so may yield electoral benefits.
3.3 Strategic Opposition (Imperfectly Informed)
I now consider a situation where the opposition is uncertain about the occurrence of fraud—
specifically, it does not observe the previously choices made by voters and the incumbent,
so it does not know the state of the world (i.e., whether outcome-altering fraud took place
or not) at the moment of making its own decision. However, the opposition is able to
construct beliefs about the state of the world based on information about voter preferences,
the cost faced by voters in the event of a post-electoral conflict, the cost of fraud faced by
the incumbent, and the incumbent’s expected utility from remaining in office. This situation
is interesting because it creates a dilemma for a strategic opposition: even though it might
prefer not to challenge a fair incumbent victory (because of its attachment to democratic
values, or because of the low chance of winning a challenge of fair election results), the
absence of precise information about the true election outcome may lead it to challenge a
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fair outcome even when it would strongly prefer not to do so were it perfectly informed about
the state of the world.
In order to study this imperfect information situation, I assume that the opposition up-
dates its beliefs about the behavior of voters and incumbent based on information about the
observed costs of a post-electoral conflict faced by voters and of committing fraud faced by
the incumbent. I find two pure strategy equilibria (where players make deterministic deci-
sions) and one mixed strategy equilibria (where players make probabilistic decisions) of this
game; where by equilibrium I refer to sets of decisions made by the different players (voters,
the incumbent, and the opposition), where none of them has an incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium strategy, and where the behavior of voters and the incumbent is consistent
with the opposition’s beliefs.
One equilibrium situation takes place when voters vote for the incumbent either sincerely
or strategically if
cv < K1
(
β, β, g, cp, cf
) · (uI − uO)
where K1 is a constant, whose value depends on the likelihood that the opposition wins
either a fair or an unfair challenge, the spoils from office enjoyed by the winning party,
and on the maximum costs of committing fraud faced by the incumbent and of challenging
the official result faced by the opposition (the exact mathematical expression is derived in
appendix C.1). In those cases in which voters sincerely prefer the incumbent (that is, when
uI > uO), the above condition implies that voters behave sincerely whenever the cost of a
post-electoral conflict that they face is sufficiently low. When this condition is satisfied, the
opposition believes that most voters voted for the incumbent, and will only challenge the
election outcome if the cost it faces in the event of a post-electoral conflict is lower than the
expected benefits of the challenging a fair outcome (β · g). The latter condition would, of
course, never be satisfied in the case of a democratic opposition, since then the opposition
would never be able to successfully organize collective action against the fair official result.
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In this situation, the incumbent will never commit fraud in the event of a fair victory, but
will commit outcome-altering fraud to prevent an opposition victory whenever the cost of
omitting fraud is lower than the expected benefit of doing so. Since voters’ optimal strategy
is to support the incumbent, the incumbent decision regarding whether to commit outcome-
altering fraud only takes place off the equilibrium path. Given the distribution of cf , the
probability of outcome-altering fraud off the equilibrium path (α3) equals
α3 =
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g
cf
The latter probability is larger under a democratic opposition, in which case: α3 =
g
cf
, than
under an authoritarian opposition, in which case: α3 =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
. Also, note that
the probability of outcome-altering fraud off the equilibrium path is larger under a generic
imperfectly informed opposition than under a generic perfectly informed opposition. The
latter result follows intuitively, since off the equilibrium path the opposition is under the
erroneous belief that most voters supported the incumbent, so it challenges the fraudulent
result less frequently, thus creating incentives for the incumbent to commit fraud more
frequently off the equilibrium path.
Another equilibrium situation takes place when voters vote for the opposition either
strategically or sincerely if
cv > K2
(
β, β, g, cp, cf
) · (uI − uO)
where K2 is a constant, whose value depends on the likelihood that the opposition wins either
a fair or an unfair challenge, the spoils from office enjoyed by the winning party, and on the
maximum costs of committing fraud faced by the incumbent and of challenging the official
result faced by the opposition (the exact mathematical expression is derived in appendix C.1).
In those cases in which voters sincerely prefer the opposition (that is, when uI > uO), the
above condition implies that voters behave strategically whenever the cost of a post-electoral
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conflict they might face if the incumbent is declared the winner is sufficiently high. When
this condition is satisfied, the opposition believes it should be declared the election winner,
and will challenge the election outcome if the cost it faces in the event of a post-electoral
conflict is lower than the expected benefits of challenging an unfair outcome (β ·g). The latter
condition is as likely to be satisfied in the case of a democratic opposition as in the case of
an authoritarian opposition. In this situation, the incumbent will never commit superfluous
fraud in the event of a fair victory (something that would only happen off the equilibrium
path), but will commit outcome-altering fraud to prevent an opposition whenever the cost
of committing fraud is lower than the expected benefit of doing so. Since voters’ optimal
strategy is to support the opposition, the incumbent decision regarding whether to commit
outcome-altering fraud now takes place along the equilibrium path. Given the distribution
of cf , the probability of outcome-altering fraud along the equilibrium path (α4) equals
α4 =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
The latter probability does not depend on the opposition sub-type (democratic or authori-
tarian), and is similar to the probability of outcome-altering fraud in the case of a generic
perfectly-informed opposition.
Lastly, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium where all players (the representative
voter, the incumbent, and the opposition) behave probabilistically by mixing over possible
actions. In order to solve the problem, I search for sets of probabilities (of voting for the
incumbent, committing fraud, and challenging the official election result, respectively), such
that all players feel indifferent toward the available actions, given others’ mixing probabilities
(and therefore, since they feel indifferent, do not have any incentive to deviate from a strategy
that prescribes choosing each action with a given probability).
A mixed strategy equilibrium exists when:
• Voters vote for the incumbent with probability p, where
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p =
αO ·
(
β · g − c˜p
)
αO ·
(
β · g − c˜p
)− (β · g − c˜p)
where c˜p =
cp
2
is the expected value of cp that determines voters’ and incumbent’s
beliefs about the opposition’s behavior, since they make their decisions before the cost
of the post-electoral conflict faced by the opposition is revealed.
• The incumbent never commits superfluous fraud (αI = 0), but commits outcome-
altering fraud with probability αO, where
α0 =
(
1− β
β
· g−c˜f
g
)
· (uI − uO)− cv(
1 +
g−c˜f
g
)
· (uI − uO)− cv
• Voters and the incumbent believe the opposition challenges the election outcome with
probability η, where
η =
g − cf
β · g
Note that the opposition’s indifference between accepting and challenging the outcome
given p and αO holds as long as the realized cost of the post-electoral conflict (cp) equals
its expected value c˜p. After observing the official election result and the realized value of
cp—which might be lower or larger than its expected value c˜p—the opposition will challenge
the official election result if
cp <
p · β · g + (1− p) · αO · β · g
p+ (1− p) · αO
Note that after observing cp the opposition will not feel indifferent between accepting
and challenging the official election result, and will thus behave deterministically most of the
time. Still, the fact that the opposition is unlikely to mix over actions with probabilities η
and (1− η) does not affect the equilibrium beliefs or behaviors of voters and the incumbent,
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since they do not observe cp but act based on the expected value of this cost (c˜p); thus, even
if eventually it turns out that cp is different than c˜p, they have no incentives to alter their
belief about η, nor to deviate from the equilibrium values of p and αO.
3.4 The Logic of Superfluous Fraud
In previous sections I found that whenever the incumbent receives a majority of the vote,
it faces no incentives to commit superfluous fraud. However, it is important to note that
at least three modifications of the game-theoretic setting might lead to situations where the
incumbent might find it profitable to artificially inflate its vote share even after receiving a
majority of the vote. First, in legislative elections held under proportional representation,
the share of the spoils from office perceived by the incumbent government might depend
on its vote share. In that case, the incumbent might be willing to fraudulently inflate its
vote share in order to capture a larger portion of the spoils from office (see Magaloni 2010).
Second, if the authoritarian incumbent runs elections only to “legitimize the regime and its
policies” (Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 257) and opposition parties are only allowed to exist
in order to “[help legitimize] the regime and contain conflict within the national political
elite” (Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 266), as in the case of Mexico during the period of
PRI hegemony, then the incumbent might resort to superfluous fraud in order to signal
an appearance of strength; this may be done in order to deter members of an acquiescent
opposition from turning into real competitors.
The incumbent might also face incentives to commit superfluous fraud when electoral
manipulation takes place in a decentralized manner during the electoral process instead of
after the incumbent learns the true election result. In particular, superfluous fraud is more
likely to take place when agents of the incumbent government are in charge of coercing voters
and manipulating votes and election returns in scattered locations and at different stages of
the electoral process; while the voting is taking place and during the vote count, implying
that the incumbent does not yet have exact information about the true election outcome,
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and that it might be difficult to coordinate the “manipulation effort” as to achieve fraud
of a particular magnitude. In those cases, the incumbent might estimate the level of fraud
necessary to ensure a certain victory; the greater the incumbent’s uncertainty about the true
election outcome, the greater the magnitude of superfluous fraud. Thus, the logistics of the
different types of voter fraud, as well as the uncertainty about the true election outcome,
might lead to some degree of superfluous fraud on many occasions, specially when the cost
of superfluous fraud is low and when the opposition is likely to tolerate voter fraud up to a
certain extent.
4 Real World Examples
The results of the game-theoretic analysis done in previous sections can be used to study and
interpret the outcomes of real-world elections held in the context of autocratic competition.
The findings corresponding to an acquiescent opposition are consistent with the situation
observed in Mexico before the split off of the hegemonic Institutional Revolutionary Party
(PRI) in the late eighties. Before that time, the PRI periodically ran safely in national
elections, and the main opposition parties did not pose a serious challenge to the party’s
hegemony. According to Craig and Cornelius (1995, p. 249) “occasional eruptions of elite
or mass-dissent were dissipated by co-opting the dissident’s leaders into the state-sanctioned
parties or interest organizations, or they were repressed.” Moreover, according to the authors,
“the weakness of opposition parties made it possible for the PRI-government apparatus to
control election outcomes without blatant rigging” (Craig and Cornelius, 1995, p. 257). This
is consistent with the finding that, under an acquiescent opposition the incumbent party will
win the election without the need of resorting to electoral fraud.
The findings corresponding to an anti-regime opposition, in turn, can contribute to un-
derstanding the case of the 1994 election in Lesotho. In May 1998 Lesotho’s ruling party
“Lesotho Congress of Democrats” (LCD) overwhelmingly won the national elections obtain-
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ing 79 out of 80 legislative seats. The process was monitored by multiple international ob-
servers including the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme, who
reported that the election had been conducted according to international standards. Still,
opposition parties contested the results in the courts and in the streets, and requested the
intervention of the South African Development Community (SDAC). According to Southall
(1999, p. 684), “the case that the election was rigged is largely without substance” and the
crisis was caused by the nature of results produced by the first-past-the-post electoral system.
This case is interesting because the opposition was able to win the challenge in spite of the
questionable fairness of the fraud allegations. One possible reason why opposition parties
were able to mobilize successfully against the incumbent is because the first-past-the-post
electoral system was perceived to be bringing about unfair outcomes, and this caused part
of the population to exhibit ‘anti-system’ attitudes.
Lastly, the results corresponding to a democratic opposition are consistent with the
events leading to the fall of Fujimori after the 2000 Peruvian presidential election. In the
latter case, serious allegations of electoral fraud were made during the first round of voting.
Opposition candidate Alejandro Toledo was able to convince voters of the need to boycott the
presidential runoff (Carter Center, 2000). This resulted in a large increase in invalid ballots
cast as a sign of protest, reaching close to 30% of the total vote. According to Tanaka (2000),
Fujimori’s unfair victory derived in the “opening of three battle fronts: one international,
one at the Congress, and one of street mobilization” (translated from Tanaka 2000, p. 12)
used by the opposition to challenge the fairness of the election result. Finally, Fujimori
called for new elections and fled the country.8 In earlier sections I found that when there
is agreement about the occurrence of electoral fraud, a democratic opposition is likely to
challenge the official election result, and the probability that this happens increases with the
8The New York Times, “Peru’s President Calls an Election and Will Not Run” (September
17, 2000) and “Fujimori Lingers in Japan, Fueling the Confusion Back in Peru” (November
19, 2000).
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chance that the opposition wins the post-electoral contest. As argued in the introduction and
further illustrated by the Colored Revolutions (Tucker, 2007), the more blatant the fraud, the
higher the probability the opposition is able to organize successful collective action against
the regime.
5 Discussion
It has been argued that when the opposition is willing to challenge election outcomes “the
real risks emerge when the ruling party loses: will it accept defeat and yield power peacefully,
or will it choose to steal the election from the opposition, even is this entails serious post-
electoral conflict?” (Magaloni, 2006, pp. 77-78). According to this argument, a serious
post-electoral conflict may take place when the incumbent won the election by resorting to
electoral fraud. In that case, fears of post-electoral conflict may benefit the regime because
they motivate citizens to vote for the incumbent to prevent a post-electoral conflict, and
it enables the incumbent to win the election legitimately without incurring the costs of
committing fraud. But does this result hold when the opposition is not democratic—one
that is opportunistic and challenges any election outcome, regardless of whether there was
fraud or not—or if it is democratic but imperfectly informed, that it does not know whether
the incumbent won fairly or through manipulation of election returns?
I find that the only case where opposition supporters might vote strategically for the
incumbent to prevent violence, is in the case of a perfectly informed strategic opposition.
When the challenger is non-strategic—ranging from acquiescent to opportunistic—or when
it is strategic but lacks information about the election outcome, then fears of post-electoral
violence need not benefit the incumbent at the expense of the opposition. Moreover, under
multiple circumstances, if the likelihood of fraud is small—for instance, when the cost of
committing fraud is large—then opposition supporters have no incentives to desert their
preferred candidate. Moreover, when the opposition challenges any unfavorable result, voters
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preferring the incumbent are the ones who may have incentives to vote strategically and
desert their favorite candidate, not opposition supporters.
In addition to results concerning voter behavior, I found that the likelihood the incumbent
behaves dishonestly decreases with the cost of committing electoral fraud, as well as with
the probability the opposition successfully challenges the results. This implies that if there
is optimism about the success of a challenge, then the incumbent has incentives to behave
honestly. Also, the likelihood of fraud increases with the spoils from office. Thus, the more
the incumbent can use its tenure for personal gain, the more likely it will try to manipulate
unfavorable election results. Second, the likelihood a democratic opposition contests the
results increases with the probability it wins the challenge, but decreases with the cost of
the fight. The implication is that the easier and cheaper it is to mount successful collective
action, the more prone the opposition will be to challenge the outcome. Also, similar to the
incumbent, the probability the opposition challenges an unfavorable outcome increases with
the spoils from office.
In my analysis, I assumed the opposition is unified, so the incumbent cannot focus on
manipulating the votes cast for one particular opposition party. Weingast (1997) shows that
when two social groups share different views regarding the incumbent’s respect for citizens’
rights, then the latter can use this situation to abuse the right of one group, and still have
the other group acquiesce to the abusive behavior. The only way in which an incumbent can
be forced into not transgressing the rights of any social group, is if both groups are able to
coordinate into not acquiescing to any government abuse. One interesting direction for future
research would be to extend the model to a multi-party situation, where the incumbent can
choose to steal the votes from one particular party, but count ballots cast in support of the
other party.
International observers play no role in my model. Still, Carothers (1997) and Hyde (2008)
mention that monitoring by election observers may help promote democratic principles,
detect and deter electoral fraud, increase voter confidence in the procedural fairness of the
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election, help organize foundational elections, provide technical assistance to local election
observers, and disseminate standards of election administration. Paradoxically Beaulieu
and Hyde (2009) find evidence that the frequency of pre-election boycotts is larger when
international observers are present. This may be explained in part, because incumbents
adapt by employing new manipulation strategies that go undetected by election observers
(Simpser, 2008). In future research, it would be important to consider a situation where the
deployment of election observers is used by incumbents to signal their honest or deceitful
intentions.
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Appendices
A Non-Strategic Opposition
In this section I use backward induction to find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE) of the game when the opposition is non-strategic and challenges any incumbent
victory (fair or unfair) with an exogenous probability δ (see Figure 2).
A.1 Incumbent Behavior
If a majority of voters support the incumbent (v = I, upper section of the tree), the incum-
bent’s expected utility is given by:
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u (I|v = I) =
{
(1− δ) · g + δ · (1− β) · g if No Fraud,
(1− δ) · (g − cf ) + δ ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
Since cf > 0, fraud is strictly dominated when a majority of voters voted for the incum-
bent.
Instead, if a majority of voters voted for the opposition (v = O, lower section of the tree),
the incumbent’s expected utility is given by:
u (I|v = O) =
{
0 if No Fraud,
(1− δ) · (g − cf ) + δ ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
The incumbent commits fraud if cf <
(
1− β · δ) · g, otherwise it communicates the true
election outcome. The larger the right-hand-side of this inequality, the greater the likelihood
of fraud. Thus, when v = O the likelihood of fraud decreases with the probability the
opposition wins a contest as well as with the probability the opposition contests the election
outcome, and increases with the spoils from holding office.
A.2 Voter Behavior
The representative voter does not observe cf , but knows that cf ∼ U (0, cf ). Thus, it thinks
that the probability of fraud in the lower part of the tree is given by the probability that
cf <
(
1− β · δ) · g, which equals α = (1− β · δ) · g
cf
. The voter’s expected utility is given
by the following expression:
u (V ) =
{
(1− δ) · uI + δ ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv] if v = I,
(1− α) · uO + α ·
{
(1− δ) · uI + δ ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv]} if v = O
Since β > β, a voter preferring the opposition always votes sincerely.
Also, note that if δ = 0 as in the case of an acquiescent opposition, then a voter preferring
the incumbent also votes sincerely.
Next, I consider voter behavior when δ > 0. In this case, a voter preferring the incumbent
behaves sincerely if:
cv <
[
1− β · δ − α · (1− β · δ)] · (uI − uO)
δ · (1− α)
Otherwise, the voter votes ‘strategically’ for the opposition to prevent the occurrence of
a post-electoral conflict.
If uI and α are ‘large enough’—such that uI−uO > δ · cv and α >
(
1− β) · g
cf
>
β
β
—then
sincerity condition always holds. The intuition for this result is the following: when the
probability of fraud is large, then there is a large probability that the voter experiences cv
even if it supports the opposition, so it prefers to vote sincerely for the incumbent.
By substituting α =
(
1− β · δ) · g
cf
and considering different values of δ, it is pos-
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sible to obtain voters’ and parties’ optimal strategies for different opposition types. Let
σv (uI , uO, cv) indicate the representative voter’s strategy for a given level of uI − uO and cv,
with σv (cv) ∈ {I, O}, where I indicates voting for the incumbent, and O indicates voting for
the opposition; and let σI (cf , σv) indicate the incumbent’s strategy given cf and the choice
of the representative voter, with σI (cf , σv) ∈
{
F, F
}
, where F indicates committing fraud,
and F indicates acknowledging the election outcome. Optimal strategies will depend on the
opposition’s type.
First, I present the results for an acquiescent opposition; one that never challenges an
unfavorable outcome.
Result 1 [Acquiescent Opposition (δ = 0)]: If σv = I, the incumbent does not commit
fraud. However, the incumbent does commit fraud if σv = O and cf < g. Also, if σv = O
and cf > g, then the incumbent behaves honestly. Regarding voter behavior, it is always
optimal for the representative voter to behave sincerely.
Second, I present the results for an opportunistic opposition; one that always challenges
an unfavorable outcome.
Result 2 [Opportunistic Opposition (δ = 1)]: If σv = I, the incumbent never commits
fraud. However, the incumbent does commit fraud if σv = O and cf <
(
1− β) · g. Last,
if σv = O and cf >
(
1− β) · g, then the incumbent behaves honestly. Regarding voter
behavior, if uI − uO < 0, the voter always behaves sincerely. If instead uI − uO > 0 and
cv <
[
1−β−(1−β)2· gcf
]
·(uI−uO)
1−(1−β)· gcf
, then the voter supports the incumbent. Otherwise, if uI−uO > 0
and cv >
[
1−β−(1−β)2· gcf
]
·(uI−uO)
1−(1−β)· gcf
, then the voter supports the opposition.
Last, I present the results for a generic non-strategic opposition; one that challenges the
results with some positive exogenous probability.
Result 3 [Non-Strategic Opposition (0 < δ < 1)]: If σv = I, the incumbent never commits
fraud. However, the incumbent does commit fraud if σv = O and cf <
(
1− β · δ) · g, then
the incumbent commits fraud. Last, if σv = O and cf >
(
1− β · δ) · g, then the incumbent
behaves honestly. Regarding voter behavior, if uI − uO < 0, the voter always behaves
sincerely. If instead uI − uO > 0 and cv <
[
1−β·δ−(1−β·δ)2· gcf
]
·(uI−uO)
δ·
[
1−(1−β)· gcf
] , then the voter supports
the incumbent. Otherwise, if uI − uO > 0 and cv >
[
1−β·δ−(1−β·δ)2· gcf
]
·(uI−uO)
δ·
[
1−(1−β)· gcf
] , then the voter
supports the opposition.
According to these results, when the opposition is non-strategic, a voter preferring the
opposition always behaves sincerely, regardless of the probability the opposition challenges
the results. Differently, a voter preferring the incumbent always behaves sincerely for an
31
acquiescent opposition (δ = 0), but may vote ‘strategically’ to reduce the likelihood of a
post-electoral conflict when there is a non-zero probability that the opposition challenges the
results (δ > 0). The motivation for doing so is that when the incumbent has little incentives
to commit fraud, there is a large chance that the opposition is declared the official winner
when the latter is supported by the representative voter. Therefore, a voter preferring the
incumbent might be able to prevent post-electoral violence by voting for its least preferred
alternative.
B Strategic Opposition (Perfectly Informed)
In this section I compute equilibrium behaviors when the opposition is strategic and decides
whether to challenge the results after observing voter and incumbent choices (see Figure 3).
Again, I use backward induction to find the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of
the game.
B.1 Opposition Behavior
In the upper section of the tree, the challenger’s expected utility is:
u (O|v = I) =
{
0 if Accept,
β · g − cp if Challenge
Thus, the opposition challenges the results if cp < β · g.
Then, in the lower section of the tree, the challenger’s expected utility (when the incum-
bent commits fraud) is:
u (O|v = O) =
{
0 if Accept,
β · g − cp if Challenge
Thus, the opposition challenges the results if cp < β · g—that is, when the cost of a post-
electoral conflict (cp) is lower than the expected benefit of challenging the election outcome
(β · g).
B.2 Incumbent Behavior
The incumbent does not observe cp, but knows that cp ∼ U (0, cp). Let ηI denote the
probability that the opposition challenges the official result when the representative voter
voted for the incumbent (upper section of the tree), and ηO denote the probability that the
opposition challenges the official result when the representative voter voted for the opposition
and the incumbent committed outcome-altering electoral fraud (lower section of the tree).
Based on knowledge about the distribution of cp, the incumbent believes that the probability
of challenge in the upper section of the tree equals ηI = β · gcp . Similarly, the incumbent
thinks the probability of challenge in the lower section of the tree equals ηO = β · gcp . Note
that ηO > ηI , since β > β.
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In the upper section of the tree, the incumbent’s expected utility is given by:
u (I|v = I) =
{
(1− ηI) · g + ηI ·
(
1− β) · g if No Fraud,
(1− ηI) · (g − cf ) + ηI ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
Since cf > 0, fraud is strictly dominated when v = I.
In the lower section of the tree, the incumbent’s expected utility is given by:
u (I|v = O) =
{
0 if No Fraud,
(1− ηO) · (g − cf ) + ηO ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
Thus, the incumbent commits fraud if cf <
(
1− η0 · β
) · g
cf
. Substituting for η0, this
inequality equals cf <
(
1− β2 g
cp
)
· g
cf
. These results indicate that the probability the
incumbent commits fraud increases with
(
1− β), with g, as well as with the maximum
cost of the challenge (cp), and decreases with the maximum cost of committing fraud (cf ).
Although cf is not observed before the incumbent moves, we can use the assumption that
cf ∼ U (0, cf ) to compute the probability (α) that the incumbent commits fraud. This
probability equals α =
(
1− η0 · β
) · g
cf
.
B.3 Voter Behavior
The voter’s expected utility is given by the following expression:
u (V ) =
{
(1− ηI) · uI + ηI ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv] if v = I,
(1− α) · uO + α ·
{
(1− ηO) · uI + ηO ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv]} if v = O
Thus, the voter supports the incumbent if:
(ηI − α · ηO) · cv <
[
1− β · ηI − α ·
(
1− β · ηO
)] · (uI − uO) .
Note that if ηI < α · ηO, then a voter preferring the incumbent always behaves sincerely.
In particular, notice that ηI = 0, when β = 0, so in that special case incumbent supporters
always behave sincerely. Differently, if ηI > α · ηO, it might be optimal for the voter to vote
strategically for the opposition . In that case, the likelihood of fraud and challenge in the
lower part of the tree is so small, that a voter preferring the incumbent might want to vote
for the opposition to prevent post-electoral conflict.
Substituting for ηI = β · gcp and ηO = β ·
g
cp
, I get that the voter supports the incumbent
if:
cv <
[
1− β2 · g
cp
− g
cf
·
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)2]
· (uI − uO)[
β −
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
· β
]
· g
cp
Note that the denominator of the right hand expression (ηI − α · ηO) is positive if ββ >
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(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
. This happens when the probability of fraud in the lower part of the tree is
‘small enough’, so there is a higher chance of preventing post-electoral violence by supporting
the opposition, than behaving sincerely.
Differently, if the voter prefers the opposition, then it votes ‘strategically’ for the incum-
bent if (α · ηO − ηI) · cv >
[(
1− β · ηI
)− α · (1− β · ηO)] · (uO − uI). Note that this may
only happen if ηI < α · ηO, i.e. when the likelihood of fraud and challenge is so large in
the lower part of the tree, that a voter might want to vote for the incumbent to reduce the
chance of a post-electoral conflict.
Substituting for ηI = β · gcp and ηO = β ·
g
cp
, I get that the voter supports the incumbent
if:
cv >
[
1− β2 · g
cp
− g
cf
·
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)2]
· (uO − uI)[(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
· β − β
]
· g
cp
Voting strategically for the incumbent is only reasonable if ηI < α · ηO—i.e. if ββ <(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
. In that case, the likelihood of a challenge is lower in the upper section of
the tree, and this might give the voter an incentive to vote ‘strategically’ for the incumbent
to prevent a post-electoral conflict.
Finally, note that everything else constant, P (v = I|uO > uI) is increasing in gcf , since
it increases the chance of fraud in the lower section of the tree; increasing in g
cp
, since it
increases the chance of a challenge in the lower section of the tree (more than it does in the
upper section), increasing in cv; and decreasing in uI − uO.
If we consider the likelihood the representative voter behaves strategically, it is important
to notice that both are increasing in cv, and they exist only when the expected gains from
preventing a post-electoral conflict are larger than those from helping elect their favorite
candidate, i.e., when ηI > α · ηO or ηI < α · ηO, for a voter preferring the incumbent, or one
preferring the opposition, respectively.
The notation used to identify the strategies of the representative voter and the incum-
bent resemble the ones in the previous section. In addition, I let σO (cp, σv, σI) denote the
opposition’s strategy, where cp indicates the cost of challenging the results, σI indicates the
incumbent strategy in the second period, and σv indicates the voter’s strategy in the first
period. Also, I let σO (cp, σv, σI) ∈ {A,P}, where A indicates accepting the official election
outcome, and P indicates challenging the results.
Result 4 (Strategic and Perfectly Informed Opposition): If σv = I and cp < β · g,
then the opposition challenges the official results. Otherwise, If σv = I and cp > β · g,
then the opposition accepts the outcome. If σv = O and cp < β · g, then the opposition
challenges the official results. Otherwise, if σv = O and cp > β · g, then the opposition
accepts the outcome. Second, if σv = I, then the incumbent does not commit fraud. How-
ever, if σv = I and cf <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, then the incumbent commits fraud. Otherwise,
if σv = I and cf >
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, then the incumbent behaves honestly. Finally, if
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(ηI − α · ηO) · cv <
[(
1− β · ηI
)− α · (1− β · ηO)] · (uI − uO), where ηI = β · gcp , ηO = β · gcp
and α =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
, then the voter supports the incumbent. Otherwise, it supports
the opposition.
Result 5 : Let ηI = β · gcp , ηO = β ·
g
cp
. Then, a voter preferring the incumbent (uI−uO > 0)
may behave strategically only when ηI > α · ηO and cv >
[(
1−β2· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β2· g
cp
)2]·(uI−uO)[
β−
(
1−β2· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β
]
· g
cp
.
Differently, a voter preferring the opposition (uI − uO < 0) may behave strategically only
when ηI < α · ηO and cv >
[(
1−β2· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β2· g
cp
)2]·(uO−uI)[(
1−β2· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β−β
]
· g
cp
.
I use the term democratic opposition to refer to the case where β = 0. In this case,
the opposition is able to successfully mount collective action against the regime only when
the latter won the election by resorting to electoral fraud. Below I restate Result 4 for the
special case of a democratic opposition.
Result 6 [Democratic Opposition (Strategic and Perfectly Informed with β = 0)]: If
σv = I, then the opposition never challenges the official results. However, the opposition
challenges the official results if σv = O and cp < β · g. Otherwise, if σv = O and cp > β · g,
then the opposition accepts the outcome. Second, if σv = I, then the incumbent does
not commit fraud. However, if σv = I and cf <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, then the incumbent
commits fraud. Otherwise, if σv = I and cf >
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, then the incumbent behaves
honestly. Finally, if (ηI − α · ηO) · cv <
[
1− α · (1− β · ηO)] · (uI − uO), where ηO = β · gcp
and α =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
, then the voter supports the incumbent. Otherwise, it supports
the opposition.
Next, I compare the likelihood of fraud under a non-strategic opposition, with the likeli-
hood of fraud under a strategically and perfectly informed opposition.
Result 7 (Comparison of Incumbent Behavior with Non-Strategic vs. Strategic Op-
position): From the voter’s point of view, the probability the incumbent commits fraud
when σv = O equals α1 =
(
1− β · δ) · g
cf
in the case of a non-strategic opposition, and
α2 =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
in the case of a strategic and perfectly informed opposition. Thus, the
likelihood the incumbent commits fraud is larger in the first case when δ < β · g
cp
, where δ is
the exogenous probability a non-strategic opposition challenges the official election results.
C Strategic Opposition (Imperfectly Informed)
In this section, I assume the opposition does not observe either voter or incumbent behavior,
but updates its beliefs by taking into account the observed costs of post-electoral conflict
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and of committing fraud (see Figure 4). In this case, I find the Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium
(PBE) of the game by computing the optimal opposition decision such that both the voter
and the incumbent have no incentive to deviate from beliefs.
The notation used to identify the strategies of the representative voter and the incumbent
resemble the ones in the previous sections. However, the challenger no longer observes σv
or σI . Instead, it observers the official election winner which I denote W ∈ {I, O}. Thus,
I let σO (cp,W ) denote the opposition’s strategy in response to cp and W . Also, I again
let σO (cp,W ) ∈ {a, cp}, where A indicates accepting the official election outcome, and cp
indicates challenging the results.
C.1 Pure Strategy Equilibria
1. Suppose the opposition and the incumbent behave according to the following rules:
σO (cp,W ) =
{
cp if W=I and cp < β · g
a if W=I and cp > β · g
σI (cf , σv) =

cf if σv = O and cf <
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g
nf if σv = O and cf >
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g
nf if σv = I
Then, the voter believes that in case σv = O, fraud takes place with probability
α =
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g
cf
. Also, it believes that a challenge takes places with probability
η = β · g
cp
. Given these expectations, the vote supports the incumbent whenever:
cv <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)2[
β −
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g
cf
· β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO)
Notice that the opposition observes cv, and uses this to construct expectations about
voter behavior. If the inequality holds, the opposition believes the voter will support
the incumbent, and therefore will challenge the results if cp < β · g, otherwise, it will
accept the official election outcome. Finally, the incumbent observes cv and σv, but
does not not observe cp. However, it knows that cp ∼ U (0, cp), and that the opposition
believes the voter supported the regime. Therefore thinks a challenge takes place with
probability η = β · g
cp
. In that case, it never commits fraud when σv = I, it is strictly
dominated for cf > 0. Differently, in the out-of-equilibrium path, i.e. when σv = O, it
commits fraud if cf <
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
·g, and otherwise it behaves honestly. Thus, this
behavior is always an equilibrium whenever cv <
(
1−β2· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)2
[
β−
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO).
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2. Suppose the opposition and the incumbent behave according to the following rules:
σO (cp,W ) =
{
cp if W=I and cp < β · g
a if W=I and cp > β · g
σI (cf , σv) =

cf if σv = O and cf <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
nf if σv = O and cf >
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
nf if σv = I
Then, the voter believes that in case σv = O, fraud takes place with probability
α =
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
. Also, it believes that a challenge takes places with probability
η = β · g
cp
. Given these expectations, the vote supports the opposition whenever:
cv >
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)2[
β −
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g
cf
· β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO)
Notice that the opposition observes cv, and uses this to construct expectations about
voter behavior. If the inequality holds, the opposition believes it was supported by the
representative voter, and therefore will challenge the results if cp < β · g, otherwise,
it will accept the official election outcome. Finally, the incumbent observes cv and
σv, but does not not observe cp. However, it knows that cp ∼ U (0, cp), and that the
opposition believes the voter supported the regime. Therefore it thinks a challenge
takes place with probability η = β · g
cp
. In that case, it never commits fraud in the
out-of-equilibrium path, i.e., when σv = I. Differently, in case σv = O, it commits
fraud if cf <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, and otherwise it behaves honestly. Thus, this behavior
is always an equilibrium whenever cv >
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β2· g
cp
)2
[
β−
(
1−β2· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO).
Result 8 [Strategic and Imperfectly Informed Opposition (pure strategy equilibria)]:
1. If uI − uO < 0, or uI − uO > 0 and cv >
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β2· g
cp
)2
[
β−
(
1−β2· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO), then the
opposition challenges the results whenever W = I and cp < β ·g. Otherwise, if W = O,
or W = I and cp > β · g, it accepts the results. Also, if σv = I, or if σv = O and
cf >
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
· g, then the incumbent behaves honestly. However, if σv = O and
cf <
(
1− β2 · g
cp
)
·g, then the incumbent commits fraud [σI (cf , σv) = F ]. Finally, the
voter supports the opposition.
2. If uI − uO > 0 and cv <
(
1−β2· g
cp
)
− g
cf
·
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)2
[
β−
(
1−β·β· g
cp
)
· g
cf
·β
]
· g
cp
· (uI − uO), then the opposition chal-
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lenges the results whenever W = I and cp < β ·g. Otherwise, if W = O, or W = I and
cp > β ·g, it accepts the results. Also, if σv = I, or if σv = O and cf >
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
·g,
then the incumbent behaves honestly. However, if σv = O and cf <
(
1− β · β · g
cp
)
· g,
then the incumbent commits fraud [σI (cf , σv) = F ]. Finally, the voter supports the
incumbent.
In sum, the main results with a strategic but imperfectly informed opposition are the
following: First, similar to the case of a non-strategic opposition, voters who prefer the
opposition always behave sincerely. The reason is that for any strategy carried out by
the opposition, the likelihood of a challenge is the same in the upper and lower section of
the tree, and in that case the expected utility of behaving sincerely is larger than the one
corresponding to a vote for the incumbent. Second, for sufficiently large cv, there is a pure
strategy equilibrium where it may be optimal for a voter preferring the incumbent to behave
strategically. In that case, the threshold values of σO and σI resemble those found for a
strategic and perfectly informed opposition when σO = O.
Also, for sufficiently low cv, there is another pure strategy equilibrium where it may be
optimal for the voter to behave sincerely. In that case, the threshold values for σO resemble
those found for a strategically and perfectly informed opposition when σO = I. Last, in the
out-of-equilibrium path—i.e., choice of σI (cf , σv = O|σv = I), the incumbent commits fraud
with a higher frequency relative to the case of a strategic and perfectly informed opposition
with σv = O. This is reasonable because given that the opposition expects σv = I, it
challenges the results less frequently, and this motivates the incumbent to commit fraud
more frequently in the out-of-equilibrium path.
C.2 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium
In order to find the mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, it is necessary to find beliefs
about the likelihood of a challenge (η), of the occurrence of outcome-altering fraud (αO), and
that the voter voted for the incumbent instead of the opposition candidate (p), such that
the opposition is expected to be indifferent to either accepting or challenging the election
result, the incumbent is indifferent to committing outcome-altering fraud or communicating
the true outcome, and the voter is indifferent to voting for either candidate.
{Incumbent Behavior
In the upper section of the tree, the incumbent’s expected utility is given by:
u (I|v = I) =
{
(1− η) · g + η · (1− β) · g if No Fraud,
(1− η) · (g − cf ) + η ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
Since cf > 0 and η is the same regardless of whether the incumbent commits fraud or
not, then the incumbent never commits fraud when v = I—it is again strictly dominated,
so αI = 0.
In the lower section of the tree, the incumbent’s expected utility is given by:
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u (I|v = O) =
{
0 if No Fraud,
(1− η) · (g − cf ) + η ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] if Fraud
In this case, since η depends on beliefs about αO, η must be such that the incumbent has
no incentive to deviate from αO. This happens when:
(1− η) · (g − cf ) + η ·
[(
1− β) · g − cf] = 0
The value of η that leaves the incumbent indifferent between committing fraud and
communicating the true election outcome equals
η =
g − cf
β · g
Voter Behavior
The voter’s expected utility is given by the following expression:
u (V ) =
{
(1− η) · uI + η ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv] if v = I,
(1− αO) · uO + αO ·
[
(1− η) · uI + η ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv]] if v = O
Thus, the voter is indifferent to supporting the incumbent or the opposition if:
(1− η) · uI + η ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv] =
(1− αO) · uO + αO ·
{
(1− η) · uI + η ·
[(
1− β) · uI + β · uO − cv]}
This equation holds if
α− 0 =
(
1− β · η) · (uI − uO)− cv(
1 + β · η) · (uI − uO)− cv
Substituting for the equilibrium level of η found in the previous step, the value of αO
that leaves the voter indifferent to voting for the incumbent or the opposition equals
α0 =
(
1− β
β
· g−c˜f
g
)
· (uI − uO)− cv(
1 +
g−c˜f
g
)
· (uI − uO)− cv
where c˜f =
cf
2
is the expected value of cf that is used to construct voters’ beliefs, since voters
make their decisons before the cost of committing fraud faced by the incumbent is revealed.
Opposition Behavior
In case the opposition observes an unfavorable outcome, i.e., an official incumbent victory,
then the it does not know whether the outcome is fair, or whether the incumbent won by
resorting to electoral fraud. Still, it has beliefs p about the probability the voter supported
the incumbent, αI about the probability the incumbent committed fraud in the upper section
of the tree, and αO about the probability the incumbent committed fraud in the lower section
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of the tree.
The opposition’s expected utility given an incumbent victory is:
u (O|I Victory) =
{
0 if Accept,
p · (β · g − cp)+ (1− p) · αO (β · g − cp) if Challenge
Thus, voters and the incumbent expect the opposition to be indifferent between accepting
and challenging the election outcome if
p · (β · g − c˜p)+ (1− p) · αO (β · g − c˜p) = 0
where c˜p =
cp
2
is the expected value of cp that is used to construct voters’ and incumbent’s
beliefs, since voters and the incumbent make their decisons before the cost of the post-
electoral conflict faced by the opposition is revealed.
This equation holds when
p =
αO ·
(
β · g − c˜p
)
αO ·
(
β · g − c˜p
)− (β · g − c˜p)
By substituting voters’ beliefs about αO into the last expression, it is possible to find
the opposition’s equilibrium belief about p that makes it indifferent to either accepting
or challenging the official election result when the cost of challenging the official election
result equals c˜p. Given this value of p voters and the incumbent expect the opposition to
have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium value of η found above. In turn, given
the incumbent’s belief about η, the incumbent is indifferent to committing outcome-fraud
or communicating the true election outcome, and thus has no incentive to deviate from
the equilibrium value of αO found before. Lastly, given the equilibrium value of α0 the
representative voter is indifferent to voting for the incumbent or the opposition, and thus
has no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium value of p found in the last step. Thus, the
set of probabilities αI , αO, η, p found in this section constitutes a mixed strategy equilibrium
of the game, since all players have incentives to behave in line with other player’s beliefs.
Note that the opposition’s indifference given p and αO holds as long as cp = c˜p. When this
does not hold, the opposition will challenge the election outcome whenever cp <
p·β·g+(1−p)·αO·β·g
p+(1−p)·αO .
However, this will not affect the equilibrium beliefs or behaviors of voters and the incumbent,
since they do not observe cp but act based on the expected value of this cost (c˜p); thus, even
if eventually it turns out that cp 6= c˜p, they have no incentives to alter their belief about η,
nor to deviate from the equilibrium values of p and αO.
Result 9 [Strategic and Imperfectly Informed Opposition (mixed strategy equilibria)]:
Let α0 =
(
1−β
β
· g−c˜f
g
)
·(uI−uO)−cv(
1+
g−c˜f
g
)
·(uI−uO)−cv
, and p =
αO·(β·g−c˜p)
αO·(β·g−c˜p)−(β·g−c˜p)
. When parameters are such that
αO and p are well defined, then: If cp <
p·β·g+(1−p)·αO·β·g
p+(1−p)·αO , the opposition challenges the official
election outcome, and otherwise accepts it. In addition, the incumbent never commits fraud
when σv = I, but manipulates the outcome withs probability αO when σv = O. Finally, the
representative voter supports the incumbent with probability p.
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Figure 3: Game Structure with a Strategic Opposition (Informed)
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Figure 4: Game Structure with a Strategic Opposition (Uninformed)
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